The Taliban and Foreign Recognition

Despite the recent moves indicating a shift toward international recognition of the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan, the Taliban still faces significant hurdles in gaining widespread recognition by the international community.

[1]

In August 2024, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), accepted a Taliban diplomat as the Afghan ambassador, taking an unprecedented step to recognize the regime as the official government of Afghanistan.[2] But with a reign characterized by systematic human rights abuses, the floodgates of international recognition are not opening anytime soon.

The territorial boundaries of Afghanistan are generally undisputed, but the region has remained without a legitimate government since the United States removed all its military forces in 2021.[3] Although foreign recognition is not a formal prerequisite to government, it is a practical obstacle for any emerging regime that hopes to retain sovereignty and engage in foreign relations.[4] When the formerly recognized Afghan government collapsed in the fallout of 2021, the Taliban quickly became de facto rulers by force.[5] As states contemplate their relationship with and recognition of the Taliban, the overwhelming majority are withholding recognition. The Taliban’s appeals for international recognition have been met with demands from other states that the regime must comply with before those states will recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.[6]

The international community has frequently cited the Taliban’s human rights violations as a key roadblock to formal recognition.[7] The regime’s strict interpretation of Islamic law has attracted international condemnation, particularly regarding the Taliban’s approach to civil rights and gender inequality.[8] Even the Taliban’s closer partners, like Qatar and China, have urged reform to improve the human rights of Afghan women.[9] Among the most blatant violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) since the Taliban’s rise to power include laws requiring full body coverage, education restrictions, travel restrictions, and prohibitions against women speaking in public.[10] Fortunately, states hoping to support Afghan women while the government is in political limbo can bring CEDAW violations in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) because Afghanistan became a party to CEDAW in 2003.[11] While there are concerns over whether an ICJ case would legitimize Taliban rule, the Court has established precedent that ensures suing a regime under CEDAW does not legitimize the government’s control.[12]

In addition to meeting international human rights standards, to secure international recognition, the Taliban will need to demonstrate true democratic participation in Afghanistan. The Taliban claims it has effective control over the Afghan territory and “enjoy[s] support [from] the [Afghan] public."[13] However, many of Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities indicate displeasure with the Taliban’s predominantly Pashtun leadership on the grounds that the current regime has failed to adequately represent their interests.[14] If the Taliban hopes to bring long-overdue stability and prosperity to the Afghan people, it needs to foster a unifying Afghan identity that encompasses the diverse ethnic groups that call Afghanistan home.[15] Doing so will not come without challenges; power-sharing agreements in Afghanistan have a bad track record and are generally distrusted by Afghan people.[16] Neither the Taliban nor the Afghan public wants to grant power to war lords or former corrupt officials.[17] The architect of any new power sharing arrangement has a tall order on their hands, but with international recognition directly tied to democratic participation, it is a necessary effort.

Resistance forces hoping to compete for government control over the Afghan region have identified the potential benefits of prioritizing inclusion, and have accordingly recruited support from minority ethnic leaders, former Afghan government officials, and former Afghan Defense Forces.[18]  So far, no government-in-exile has been recognized, but if a resistance group sufficiently organizes and the Taliban continues to disappoint the international community, a government-in-exile could find support.[19]

Up until this point, the international community appeared uncommonly unified on the issue of Taliban legitimacy. According to Tom West, the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, “[there is] so far an encouraging degree of [international] unity when it comes to holding on recognition for more meaningful steps toward respect for the rights of all Afghans, for a move toward a more representative government, toward responsible stewardship of the economy.”[20] The UAE has cracked that unified front. While disappointing, this does not indicate a shift toward leniency. A stable and independent Afghanistan is in the best interest of all parties involved, but without human rights protections and democratic participation, the Taliban has a long way to go before it fits the bill.

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[1] Ebrahim Noroozi, Photograph of a Taliban fighter standing guard Afghan women waiting to receive food rations, in Rahim Faiez, Rights Groups Slam Severe Taliban Restrictions on Afghan Women as ‘Crime Against Humanity’, AP (May 26, 2023, 8:40 AM), https://apnews.com/article/amnesty-taliban-afghan-women-persecution-92ecda618b3ed4940848b0425bc0897a.

[2] Charlotte Greenfield & Alexander Cornwell, UAE Accepts Taliban Diplomat as Afghan Ambassador, Reuters (Aug. 22, 2024, 4:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-appoints-ambassador-uae-first-time-since-afghanistan-takeover-2024-08-22/.

[3] Afghanistan Country Report 2024, BTI Transformation Index (2024), https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/AFG.

[4] In international law, statehood minimally requires (a) a permanent population; (b) clearly defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.

[5] Afghanistan Country Report 2024, supra note 3.

[6] Taliban’s Conditions to Attend UN Meeting ‘Unacceptable’, Guterres Says, Al Jazeera (Feb. 19, 2024),

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/talibans-conditions-to-attend-un-meeting-unacceptable-guterres-says; see also European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, 31 I.L.M 1485 (1992).

[7] Taliban’s Conditions to Attend UN Meeting ‘Unacceptable’, Guterres Says, supra note 6.

[8] Center for Preventive Action, Instability in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Rels. (July 1, 2024), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan.

[9] Id.

[10] Afghanistan: UN Warns of Growing Crisis Under Increasingly Authoritarian Taliban Rule, United Nations (Sept. 18, 2024), https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154491.

[11] Heather Barr, Could World Court Address Women’s Rights in Afghanistan?, Hum. Rts. Watch (Jan. 31, 2024, 9:30AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/31/could-world-court-address-womens-rights-afghanistan.

[12] Natasha Arnpriester, Manuela Londoño, Mariana Pena, Genevieve Quinn, & Duru Yavan, Q&A: Bringing a Case Before the International Court of Justice for the Rights of Afghan Women and Girls, Open Soc’y Just. Initiative (Nov. 2024),https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/q-and-a-bringing-a-case-before-the-international-court-of-justice-for-the-rights-of-afghan-women-and-girls.

[13] Ayaz Gul, Afghan Taliban's Quest for International Recognition Stuck in Neutral, VOA News (Feb. 15, 2022, 4:57 PM) (third alteration in original), https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-taliban-s-quest-for-international-recognition-stuck-in-neutral-/6443108.html.

[14] Amit Kumar & Aayushi Malhotra, Factoring Ethnicity in Taliban’s Quest for Legitimacy: An Anthropological Rewiring of the Power Structure, Geo. J. Int. Aff. (Apr. 17, 2024), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/04/17/factoring-ethnicity-in-talibans-quest-for-legitimacy-an-anthropological-rewiring-of-the-power-structure/.

[15] Id.

[16] Obaidullah Baheer, The ‘Inclusive’ Afghan Government Afghans Do Not Want, Al Jazeera (Feb. 17, 2024),

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/2/17/the-inclusive-afghan-government-afghans-do-not-want (recognizing the power-sharing agreement as part of the Bonn Conference, which gave oppressive warlords a clean slate and access to power in the name of inclusive government).

[17] Id.

[18] Lynn O’Donnell, Afghan Resistance Mulls Formation of Government in Exile, Foreign Pol’y (Sept. 24, 2021, 2:02 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/afghan-resistance-taliban-takeover-government-exile-tajikistan/.

[19] A government-in-exile is “a government temporarily established on foreign soil following the occupation of its own territory by another authority.” Government-in-exile, Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/government-in-exile (last visited Feb. 7, 2025).

[20] Ayaz Gul, supra note 13 (second alteration in original).