Alex Joske's 2022 work scrutinizes the Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence apparatus and its influence over Western impressions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [1]
[2]
In Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World, Alex Joske distinguishes China’s intelligence-gathering forte from that of other regimes, explaining that MSS agents often sought relationships with businessmen, think tank researchers, and retired officials to promote the CCP’s peaceful rise theory. On its face, the theory outlines China’s strategy to use economic growth and global influence for promoting peaceful relations with other countries. By convincing targets that China aimed to quietly gain power and gradually transition to democracy, the MSS exploited Westerners’ dreams of a liberal China. This “people-to-people” approach thus alleviated concerns about China’s ambitions. With fear gone, targets facilitated surveillance by collaborating with global MSS fronts disguised as publishing houses, cultural exchanges, or reformist groups, as examples. Ultimately, Joske believes China’s peaceful rise to be conditional on tempered Western countermeasures, and he interprets the narrative as a veiled threat through which the CCP warned rivals not to provoke conflict.
Joske identifies four mistakes that left the West vulnerable to MSS tactics throughout the last four decades. First, by directing attention toward conventional espionage tactics, Western intelligence agencies overlooked CCP social investigation efforts to influence politics. Second, agencies embraced the 'thousand grains of sand' stereotype of Chinese intelligence work, which falsely posits that the CCP enlists legions of untrained ethnic spies to indiscriminately gather information and consolidate their findings into actionable intelligence. Third, agencies hoarded information to protect intelligence, which deterred members of the same intelligence community – such as the FBI and CIA – from combining forces. Fourth, Western “China experts” often under-research their Chinese connections and fail to appreciate the security risks these relationships pose. Altogether, Joske argues that these weaknesses, coupled with the peaceful rise theory’s popularity, shoulder responsibility for softening American responses to China’s push for global hegemony.
Readers glean two important lessons from Spies and Lies. First, the book’s stories compose a compelling, cautionary tale for those interested in China-related work, showing the importance of exercising care in affiliations with the country. Whether interactions are with a front organization or a real one, CCP loyalists are always near. Second, Joske’s research methods offer valuable insights in their own right. Though source material for studying the MSS does not warrant significant discussion in the book, Joske nonetheless demonstrates that clues about Chinese intelligence work are hiding in plain sight. The book draws upon hundreds of widely available online resources, including Wikileaks, MSS publications, CCP members’ memoirs, CCP histories, business records, media reports, and personal interviews. Using these materials, Joske critically sifts through Party narratives while tracking recurring names alongside their accomplishments, thereby revealing the multiple identities of many MSS spies and fronts. At the same time, this methodology also illustrates the extent that the internet can aid spy-catchers. Scouring the web might be considered low-hanging fruit for Western intelligence officers looking to advance their careers, but the strategy is fruitful regardless. Hence, Joske’s remarkable findings as a civilian researcher suggest that specially trained officers could unmask further MSS tactics with this strategy.
Joske’s assessment of the peaceful rise theory deserves contemplation. In Spies and Lies’ most memorable passage, he does not mince words interpreting the CCP’s offer to the West:
[E]nsure that we aren’t provoked into challenging you. For now, we are still growing, but our achievements will soon match and surpass yours. Abandon Taiwan, forget universal human rights, cede your sovereignty, give us control of strategic industries and technologies and you might be allowed a place in the coming century – if we’re feeling nice.[3]
That is, Joske believes the narrative to be more than a promise, a policy position, or even a path forward. Overtly, it is a flexible idea that allows Westerners to insert their own aspirations for China; implicitly, it is a threat. Joske’s characterization proves to be accurate and alarmist at once. China’s intentions to reshape the international order became more apparent throughout President Xi Jinping’s tenure, and its objectives appear to fall in line with this interpretation. Thus, Joske’s observation of China’s ambitions is fair. However, this perspective does not address another important underside to China’s rise. American and European countries increasingly outsourced manufacturing to the Chinese starting in the late 1970s, coupling their economies. This conspicuous concession, in addition to a few other blunders on the world stage, abetted China’s rise. In other words, Joske’s interpretation avoids finding fault in Western nation’s economic decisions; rather, he chooses to sound the alarm only at China’s response.
Joske’s view that the West accepted the peaceful rise theory too quickly bears merit. By sharing numerous stories of American civilians duped into funding, assisting, or cooperating with the CCP, Joske drives home his point. Americans were too trusting, too idealistic, and too opportunistic in their China dealings, he asserts. Similarly, the FBI and CIA failed to appreciate the peaceful rise narrative’s place in MSS agents’ toolkit. But this view might oversimplify the degree of deception. At the time Zheng Bijian introduced the peaceful rise theory in 2003, China’s trajectory made the narrative plausible.[4] China had been hiding and biding, had cooperated with British negotiations concerning Hong Kong, and had yet to antagonize its maritime neighbors so openly, particularly in the South China Sea. Concomitantly, the United States diverted attention toward fighting radical Islamic terrorism, which China actively supported through United Nations resolutions, diplomacy with Pakistan, and a new counterterrorism bureau. Deterring North Korean nuclear armament also became a shared priority. Therefore, China’s external activities generally appeared in line with Western foreign policy objectives, which might further explain Americans’ willingness to believe in a peaceful rise.
Overall, Spies and Lies promises just a little more than it delivers, neglecting widespread concerns about intellectual property, military technology, cyber-espionage, and the origins of COVID-19 in favor of narrow focus on social investigations. To be clear, the book serves as an excellent resource for recognizing this form of espionage, but it simultaneously leaves readers with questions about spies’ more newsworthy achievements. Missing too are policy recommendations for resisting modern MSS tactics. The book highlights Western nations’ past deficiencies in addressing MSS influence but similarly leaves questions about current susceptibilities to surveillance. Perhaps future scholarship on more typical forms of spycraft and strategies to combat each form would best supplement Joske’s work.
Nevertheless, Spies and Lies is a riveting history of Chinese surveillance efforts. Joske evidently seeks to both educate and entertain through his writing, and he accomplishes both. His book reads like a collection of short mysteries, yet concurrently fills scholarship gaps about the social nature of MSS intelligence-gathering. Though he might overstate the impact of certain discoveries, Spies and Lies proffers important insights for a variety of audiences, from civilians to academics, intelligence officials, and policymakers. In sum, Joske’s book does not paint a rosy picture of Western triumph over Chinese influence. But his urgency to correct previous failures in addressing MSS infiltration is necessary, and one trusts the Western intelligence community will rise to his challenge.
[1] Alex Joske, Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World (2022).
[2] Paul Mozur and Chris Buckley, Photographer: Alex Plavevski/EPA, via Shutterstock, Spies for Hire: China’s New Breed of Hackers Blends Espionage and Entrepreneurship, New York Times (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/technology/china-hackers.html.
[3] Id. at 109 (interpreting China’s peaceful rise theory as a threat to the West).
[4] Id. at 84; See also China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004, Brookings Institution (June 2005), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20050616bijianlunch.pdf (providing information about Zheng Bijian’s background and translations of his speeches). Chinese Scholar Zheng Bijian took on several roles for the CCP. He was appointed director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, senior director of the Central Propaganda Department, member of the CCP Central Committee, and chairman of the China Reform Forum think tank (which Joske identifies as an MSS front). Bijian unveiled his vision for China’s peaceful rise at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in 2003, the CCP’s favorite platform to cultivate its global image. Spies and Lies, supra note 1, at 84-96.
Kommentare