The march towards conflict, or just one author’s perception of the military threat posed by China?[1]
Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks before a session of China’s National People’s Congress in Beijing in March 2023.[2]
In his book “China is Going to War,” political commentator and journalist Gordon Chang presents a bold assertion: China is actively planning for an offensive military confrontation. In doing so, Chang provides a compelling view of current Chinese domestic and foreign policy to suggest Xi Jinping is preparing his countrymen to shed blood.
Chang’s viewpoints on modern China are not necessarily in the mainstream, as he has long predicted the impending collapse of the modern Chinese state. He is a right-leaning, conservative political commentator who many might describe as a “China hawk.” In the past, he has predicted the collapse of China’s ruling regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While his past predictions haven’t always come to fruition, Chang’s current worries arguably have more credence and can be summed up by Xi Jinping’s words to his people: “dare to fight.”[3]
Chang’s work can be broken down into six sections: (1) China’s militarization, (2) Xi’s incentives to attack, (3) the failure of deterrence, (4) Taiwan, (5) dangerous intercepts, and (6) China’s grand ambitions.[4]
Chang begins with China’s unprecedented military buildup, which he quickly notes has been contemporaneous with Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2012.[5] While he initially took advantage of his appeal to the various Chinese government factions as being “factionless,” Xi quickly cemented his power by appealing to a specific base within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[6] Since 2012, Xi has seen fit to build a base of PLA hardliners, and has sought to purge any military officers that do not align with his future plans.[7] However, as Xi has steadily built this support base, he has been forced to give loyal officers what they want: an increase in military budget, which they received in the form of a 7.1% bump in 2022, and 7.2% in 2023.[8]
The next natural question is “why?” Why is China building up to attack? Chang provides a host of incentives that Xi possesses that make war more likely: Xi’s accumulation of unprecedented levels of power through party purges, a ticking clock of domestic crises, a stagnating economy in the wake of COVID, and most importantly, a projected demographic collapse that could see China lose up to nine hundred million in population over this century.[9] Xi knows that, due to his accumulation of absolute control, the problems his nation faces ultimately are attributed to him by the people.[10] It is for this reason that Xi may decide a military conquest would be in his best interest in stoking national fervor and support.[11]
While this supposedly obvious buildup occurs across the world, Chang laments America’s and the collective West’s continued failure to deter China.[12] In support, he highlights a stagnating U.S. military with outdated weapons systems, a top brass of American military leaders sending mixed signals about the threat China poses, and China’s continued flaunting of international law and norms as a sign that our attempts to deter have failed and continue to fail.[13] As more evidence of deterrence’s failure, Chang ties in China’s role in the Russo-Ukrainian war: its tacit approval of the invasion just four days after the Winter Olympics concluded in China, its elevated commodity purchases from Russia, and its offering of alternative financial services following Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT banking system.[14] Chang also repeatedly references the Chinese spy balloon which was shot down over American airspace in early 2023 as conclusive evidence that China “feels it can do whatever it wants.”[15]
While China knows it regularly crosses American red lines, it also knows that American warnings become hollower each time they are issued without actual, meaningful confrontation from the U.S.[16] Despite this, Chang admits that the West hasn’t been completely impotent in the face of increasingly bold Chinese action. For example, he notes the 2021 AUKUS pact between the U.S., U.K., and Australia, the linking of security arrangements between longtime foes Japan and Korea, and NATO’s recent interest in maintaining a permanent presence in East Asia via a new Japan office.[17] Nonetheless, as Chang puts it, “deterrence is hanging by a thread.”[18]
The next crucial question posed is “who?” Who will be the unlucky victim of Chinese military aggression? For Chang, the most likely answer is Taiwan.[19] This is not a bold assertion. In his 2021 speech marking the centennial of the CCP’s foundation, Xi Jinping stated that “[r]esolving the Taiwan question” and achieving reunification is a “historic mission and an unshakable commitment” of the CCP.[20] Chang argues that with each passing year, pressure grows on Xi to fulfill this core promise.[21] Despite Xi’s inflammatory rhetoric and his domestic incentives, however, Chang acknowledges several limitations to an invasion of Taiwan coming to fruition: (1) the major financial and human cost it would pose and the associated risk to CCP continuity, (2) Xi’s reluctance to cede PLA control to generals and admirals, and (3) the ever-present risk of U.S. intervention.[22]
Chang then details the U.S.’ longtime Taiwan strategy known as “strategic ambiguity,”[23] in which it has kept its cards close to its chest, neither officially recognizing Taiwan as independent nor backing down from extensive military aid and cooperation with the breakaway island. He then advocates for a new strategy, one that may already be in motion: “strategic clarity.”[24] This entails definitively announcing that the U.S. will defend Taiwan militarily should China make its move.[25] Luckily for Chang, President Biden has already done so four times.[26] Despite this, Chang expresses concern over the lessons Xi has learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, namely that countries can side-step broad economic sanctions while continuing to wage war.[27]
Next, Chang addresses the “how.” How is a military conflict likely to start (besides an outright invasion of Taiwan)? Numerous incidents of Chinese provocation over the past decade are listed out: dangerous maneuvers from Chinese fighter pilots, “lasering” American and ally fighter pilots from the ground, and deliberate intimidation around Second Thomas Shoal, the Sierra Madre, and elsewhere in the South China Sea.[28] Second Thomas Shoal is a part of the disputed Spratly Islands, a series of low-level features in the South China Sea near the Philippines which both the Philippines and China claim as their sovereign territory.[29] In 1999, the Philippines deliberately grounded one of its landing ships, the Sierra Madre, in Second Thomas Shoal, in order to help stake its claim to the Spratly islands.[30] In recent years, China has responded by tasking its coast guard with obstructing resupply missions to the Sierra Madre, sometimes even shooting water cannons to do so.[31]
The takeaway: China is very willing to provoke “accidents.”[32] Only, if such an “accident” is to occur, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the Chinese military. Basically, if China wants a crisis, it will get one.
Lastly, Chang wraps up his arguments with his view of China’s grand ambitions.[33] To him, China seeks to “rule” more than just Taiwan, the Philippines, and its other neighbors. He acknowledges Xi’s bold attempts to innovate and transcend the current Western-imposed international order, and he ends on an alarming note: Xi Jinping now possesses the ambition and means to end decades of peace, and he is mobilizing his people and society to do so.[34] China is going to war.
Critical Reflections
Though I disagree with much of his rhetoric, Chang makes numerous assertions with which I agree. Namely, I do think there is a non-negligible chance that Xi Jinping will order his forces to invade Taiwan in the next five years. I also agree that the U.S. has the ability to play a pivotal role in whether China decides to invade, and if it does, whether it can help Taiwan successfully hold off an amphibious invasion.
Furthermore, Chang is right to point to deficiencies in the U.S. military hardware (to an extent), and I agree that our military should prioritize mass production of anti-ship missiles and other appropriate hardware that would be especially relevant in the context of an initial defense against an invasion. Ostensibly, these weapons would be useful in Taiwanese hands. I would also add to Chang’s point that in light of the Ukraine war, the success of initial Ukrainian asymmetric warfare tactics involving the use of anti-tank weapons like Javelins and NLAWS[35] suggest that these weapons should be donated/sold en masse to Taiwan’s military. Furthermore, I firmly agree with the proposed stance of “strategic clarity” regarding the U.S. intention to defend any invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. should up arms sales to Taiwan, promote regular bilateral military training exercises, and arrange for more visits between American and Taiwanese government officials.
On the other hand, Chang makes several arguments that strain his own credibility, including that the Chinese spy balloon incident was an obvious show of Chinese intent to strike the U.S. with nuclear weapons, and that Xi has designs on making the moon and Mars sovereign Chinese territory.[36] In my opinion, Chang does not provide enough evidence to suggest that China is planning such bold action. I also don’t think it is productive to view China as being that irrational. Additionally, Chang undermines this very point by acknowledging that Xi’s primary deterrent is to maintain CCP continuity.[37] Why would Xi “blow it all up” by using nuclear weapons? While I acknowledge that Xi and China at the very least have designs of economically dominating the global and especially regional order, I believe military action at most would be limited to an attempt to reunify Taiwan.
Even then, I believe Xi Jinping is more rational than Chang gives him credit. He will have seen the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the reemergence of an American-led NATO, and he will know there is always the possibility that a decision to make war will backfire tremendously. But if Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has taught us anything, it is that leaders can make economically irrational decisions with devastating human consequences. While Chang goes further than I would in his fears about Xi’s plans, I believe it would be wise for the U.S. government and military to heed his warnings, however alarmist they may seem. China could go to war.
[1] Gordon G. Chang, China Is Going To War 1 (Encounter Books ed., 2023).
[2] AP/XINHUA/XIE HUANCHI, Xi Jinping Awarded Third Period, Saudi Arabia-Iran Reconciliation, Kompas.id (March 11, 2023), https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/03/11/xi-jinping-awarded-third-period-saudi-arabia-iran-reconciliation.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 2.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 3.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 8.
[10] Id. at 9.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 9.
[14] Id. at 13.
[15] Id. at 11.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 14.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 15.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 16–18, 20.
[23] Id. at 16.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id. at 22.
[28] Id. at 22–24.
[29] Dzirhan Mahadzir, China Coast Guard Harass Second Thomas Shoal Re-Supply Mission, U.S. Naval Institute News, (October 6, 2023), https://news.usni.org/2023/10/06/china-coast-guard-harass-second-thomas-shoal-resupply-mission.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 26.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 27.
[35] NLAWS are “Next-Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons.” John Ismay, Ukraine Is Wrecking Russian Tanks With a Gift From Britain, N.Y. Times, (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/18/us/ukraine-antitank-missiles-russia.html. NLAWs proved immensely successful for the Ukrainian resistance in the early stages of the Russian invasion. Id.
[36] Id. at 4, 26.
[37] Id. at 16–17.
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